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Abstract Collective decision-making is ubiquitous, and majority-voting and the Condorcet Jury
Theorem pervade thinking about collective decision-making. Thus, it is typically assumed that
majority-voting is the best possible decision mechanism, and that scenarios exist where individually-
weak decision-makers should not pool information. Condorcet and its applications implicitly
assume that only one kind of error can be made, yet signal detection theory shows two kinds of
errors exist, ‘false positives’ and ‘false negatives’. We apply signal detection theory to collective
decision-making to show that majority voting is frequently sub-optimal, and can be optimally
replaced by quorum decision-making. While quorums have been proposed to resolve within-group
conflicts, or manage speed-accuracy trade-offs, our analysis applies to groups with aligned
interests undertaking single-shot decisions. Our results help explain the ubiquity of quorum
decision-making in nature, relate the use of sub- and super-majority quorums to decision ecology,
and may inform the design of artificial decision-making systems.
Editorial note: This article has been through an editorial process in which the authors decide how
to respond to the issues raised during peer review. The Reviewing Editor’s assessment is that all
the issues have been addressed (see decision letter).
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.40368.001
Introduction
Effective decision-making is essential in all areas of human society and, more generally, for all organ-
isms. A fundamental question in this context is when a group of decision-makers is superior to indi-
vidual decision-makers and vice-versa (Galton, 1907; Surowiecki, 2005; Bahrami et al., 2010;
Lorenz et al., 2011; Koriat, 2012; Kurvers et al., 2016). Both in human and animal collective deci-
sion-making, the Condorcet Jury Theorem is one of the key principles guiding our thinking about
this question (List, 2004; Hastie and Kameda, 2005; King and Cowlishaw, 2007; Sumpter et al.,
2008; Austen-Smith and Feddersen, 2009; Conradt and List, 2009; Kao and Couzin, 2014a;
Marshall et al., 2017). In a nutshell, for pairwise decision problems (e.g. disease-, lie- or predator
detection), Condorcet’s Jury Theorem states that a group of decision-makers employing the majority
rule is superior to individual decision-makers in contexts where individuals are relatively accurate (i.e.
accuracy >50%); conversely, individual decision-makers are superior to majority voting groups in
contexts where individuals are relatively inaccurate (i.e. accuracy <50%). Consequently, across
diverse fields ranging from organismal behaviour and human psychology to political sciences, two
heuristics are commonly employed (List, 2004; Hastie and Kameda, 2005; King and Cowlishaw,
2007; Sumpter et al., 2008; Conradt and List, 2009; Kao and Couzin, 2014a): (i) groups of deci-
sion-makers outperform individuals only in contexts where individuals are relatively accurate and (ii)
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the majority rule is a powerful mechanism to reap the benefits of collective decision-making. We
here show that both statements are not true, and in doing so explain the ubiquity of quorum deci-
sion rules in the collective behaviour of humans and other social organisms (Seeley and Visscher,
2004; Sumpter and Pratt, 2009; Ward et al., 2012; Pratt et al., 2002; Ross-Gillespie and Ku¨m-
merli, 2014; Walker et al., 2017; Bousquet et al., 2011).
Over the past few decades, substantial research effort has focussed on two key explicit assump-
tions underlying Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, independence (i.e. judgments/votes by different mem-
bers of the group are assumed to be independent from each other) and homogeneity (i.e. all
decision-makers within a group are assumed to be identical, both in competence and in goals)
(Kao and Couzin, 2014a; Sumpter and Pratt, 2009; Boland, 1989; Ladha, 1992; Berg, 1993;
Marshall et al., 2017). We here focus on a third, implicit, assumption of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem,
namely that decision-makers make only one type of error. This assumption stands in contradiction to
the well-known fact that, when confronted with a pairwise decision problem like the one studied in
Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, two different types of error are possible (i.e. false positive and false neg-
ative). Surprisingly, up to now, this basic and well-known feature of pairwise decision problems has
not been fully taken into account when investigating Condorcet’s Jury Theorem.
We start by providing a brief summary of the basic model considered in Condorcet’s Jury Theo-
rem. We then introduce an extended model that takes into account the fact that decision-makers
can make two types of errors. Based on this extended model, we then show that Condorcet’s Jury
Theorem makes several important predictive errors, which apply to the majority of decision scenar-
ios. Moreover, majority voting is frequently suboptimal, whereas quorum-based voting with an
appropriate quorum is always optimal, in that it enables groups to simultaneously maximise true
positive rate and minimise false positive rate (Wolf et al., 2013). While an analytical solution for the
optimal quorum threshold has been derived before (Ben-Yashar and Nitzan, 1997), dependent on
true and false positive rates and key ecological characteristics (i.e. classification error cost, prior
probabilities), this analysis treated true and false positive rates as independent of these ecological
characteristics, whereas in reality the former depend on the latter. In contrast, here we also make
use of signal detection theory to optimise individual decision-makers, thereby delineating precisely
where non-majority quorums should be used, depending on parameters of the decision ecology.
Thus, the simple majority threshold is only a special case of the more general quorum decision mech-
anism, in which optimal sub-majority or super-majority quorums are the rule rather than the
exception.
Methods
Condorcet’s Jury Theorem: the basic model
Condorcet’s Jury Theorem considers a binary (pairwise) choice situation, in which a decision-maker
can choose between two actions, labelled +1 and –1. Each decision-maker is characterised by a sin-
gle parameter a, corresponding to the probability of making a correct decision, or decision accuracy.
Importantly, the decision accuracy a of each decision-maker is assumed to be conditionally-indepen-
dent of the realised decisions of all other decision-makers.
Condorcet’s Jury Theorem now considers a group of identical decision-makers of size N that per-
forms a majority vote. A simple combinatorial argument shows that if the accuracy of decision-mak-
ers is above 50% (i.e. a > 0.5), then the probability of making a correct choice increases with
increasing group size and asymptotically approaches 1 (Boland, 1989). Conversely, if the accuracy
of individual decision-makers is below 50% (i.e. a < 0.5), then the probability of making a correct
choice decreases with increasing group size and asymptotically approaches 0 (King and Cowlishaw,
2007). This is because, as group size increases, the probability of the more probable decision (+ or –
) also being the majority decision rapidly increases towards one.
These results have led to three key interpretations: first, pooling independent judgements is ben-
eficial (i.e. improves decision accuracy) whenever individuals are relatively good decision-makers
(a > 0.5) (List, 2004; King and Cowlishaw, 2007; Novaes Tump et al., 2018). Second, pooling
judgements is detrimental (i.e. decreases decision accuracy) whenever individuals are poor decision-
makers (a < 0.5) (List, 2004; King and Cowlishaw, 2007; Novaes Tump et al., 2018). Third, the
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majority rule is the appropriate mechanism to reap the benefits of collective decision-making
(List, 2004; Hastie and Kameda, 2005).
In the following, we show that each of these interpretations is incorrect. In particular, we show
that (i) in cases where decision-makers are good (a > 0.5) majority decisions may decrease decision
accuracy, (ii) in cases where decision-makers are poor (a < 0.5) majority decisions may increase deci-
sion accuracy, and (iii) pooling independent decisions is always beneficial as long as an appropriate
quorum-based decision rule is used. Taken together, these results show that, for a large proportion
of decision scenarios, the simple majority decision rule performs poorly and gives incorrect predic-
tions about group decision accuracy.
Condorcet’s Jury Theorem: an extended model
Condorcet’s Jury Theorem implicitly assumes that decision-makers can make only one error, that is,
the probability of making an incorrect decision is 1 – a. This is in contrast to the well-known fact that
– in pairwise decision problems – decision-makers can make two types of errors, false positives and
false negatives (Green and Swets, 1966; Swets, 1988). For example, an animal under predation
risk may run away in the absence of a predator (false positive) or it may not run away in the presence
of a predator (false negative) (Trimmer et al., 2008). Similarly, a doctor screening for a disease may
diagnose in the absence of a disease (false positive) or not diagnose in the presence of a disease
(false negative) (Wolf et al., 2013). As we discuss below, the implicit assumption of Condorcet’s
Jury Theorem is equivalent to assuming that decision-makers have an identical probability of com-
mitting the two errors – this is an important assumption that does not reflect the vast majority of
real world decisions.
We here consider an extension of the above-described model, which takes into account the fact
that decision-makers can make two types of errors. Again, decision-makers can choose between two
actions, +1 and –1. Unlike in the basic model above, however, and consistent with standard decision
theory for pairwise decisions, we now assume that the world can be in two states, state + and state
–, corresponding to, for example, the presence and absence of a predator or the presence and the
absence of a disease; state + holds with probability p and state – thus holds with probability 1 – p.
Action +1 is the better choice in state + (i.e. it achieves a higher payoff), while action –1 is the better
choice in state –; for example, running away is better than staying in the presence of a predator,
while staying is better than running away in the absence of a predator. Consequently, and in contrast
to the basic Condorcet model above, each decision-maker is now characterised by two parameters
a+ and a–, corresponding to the probabilities of making correct decisions in state + and state –,
respectively; this inevitably implies that individuals make two types of errors. As in the simple model
above, where decision-makers have equal accuracies a and are independent, for any individual in a
group of N individuals the probability of making a correct decision based on the true state of the
world is conditionally-independent of the probabilities of other group members making the correct
decision, given that same state of the world.
To relate our analysis to predictions made by applying Condorcet, we must define expected indi-
vidual accuracy a, as used in Condorcet, in terms of our state probability p and state-wise accuracy
parameters a+ and a–. The expected individual accuracy is thus
a ¼ paþ þ ð1  pÞa : (1)
From Equation 1 we can see that Condorcet implicitly assumes that accuracies in the two states
of the world are equal since then p disappears from the equation; as shown in Supplementary Infor-
mation, this occurs when both states of the world are equally likely, and the costs and benefits of
classifications in the two states of the world are equal, although asymmetric decision problems can
also result in equal accuracies (as can be confirmed with reference to Supplementary Information for
Figure 1). Later, we explain how signal detection theory determines optimal values of a+ and a– for
a given decision scenario where these assumptions are violated.
Results
We are now ready to formalise when Condorcet gives incorrect predictions, and when simple major-
ity voting is suboptimal. We begin by determining optimal values of a+ and a–. Given the prior
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probability p, the cost and benefits associated with the two states of the world, and the state-depen-
dent characteristics of the cue(s) decision-makers base their decisions on, the optimal realised indi-
vidual accuracies a+ and a– are derived by solving a signal detection problem (Figure 1). Signal
detection theory has been applied repeatedly to hypothetical and real world decision problems, for
example predator detection by foraging animals (Trimmer et al., 2008; Trimmer et al., 2017); diag-
nostic decision-making (Kurvers et al., 2016; Wolf et al., 2015); and lie detection (Klein and Epley,
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Figure 1. Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve plot showing the optimal compromise between true
positive rate (TPR = a+) and false positive rate (FPR = 1 – a–). The shape of the ROC curve is determined by the
difficulty of the decision problem (e.g. Shettleworth, 2010), with hard decision curves lying close to the dashed
diagonal, and easy decision curves approaching the left and top edge of the plot. According to prior probability
of states, and relative cost of errors, an optimal decision-maker then selects a point on the ROC curve that gives
the best possible expected decision performance; points that do not prioritise accuracy in either state of the world
(a+=a– , TPR = 1 – FPR; dotted diagonal, and filled circle) are implicitly assumed by the Condorcet Jury Theorem,
as discussed in the main text and Figure 2. The white square represents the region of ROC space in which simple
majority decisions are best, and Condorcet predictions are fulfilled (note the equal accuracy dotted line described
above always occupies this region). Light grey triangles represent regions of ROC-space which, if selected by
optimal individual decision-makers, lead to sub-optimal collective decisions when combined by simple majority
decision rules; in this region Condorcet predictions are systematically incorrect. The dark grey lower-right triangle
represents combinations of TPR and FPR that should not be observed, since in these decision-makers are
systematically wrong and could simultaneously improve both their TPR and FPR by simply inverting their
predictions to move above the dashed diagonal. ROC parameters: – = 0, + = 1, s = 1, prior = ½, ratio = 1.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.40368.002
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2015). As described in the appendix, for simplicity and tractability our analysis is conducted for the
simplest signal detection problem, determining which of two normal distributions a single scalar ran-
dom variable is drawn from; this could, in the example of a predator detection problem, be the
instantaneous volume of a sound heard by a forager. In this case signal detection theory enables us
to find a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve of optimal a+, a– value pairs, dependent on
decision difficulty (Figure 1; Green and Swets, 1966; Shettleworth, 2010); the optimal point of
!"! !"# !"$ !"% !"& '"!
!
!""
!
!"
'
'!
'!!
!
!""
!
!"
'
'!
'!!
()*+) ,)+-.-*/*01 +2 30.04 !
!
""
#
"
$
#
%
&
"'
&(
#
!)
*
")
+
#
!"! !"# !"$ !"% !"& '"!
!
!""
!
!"
'
'!
'!!
!
!""
!
!"
'
'!
'!!
()*+) ,)+-.-*/*01 +2 30.04 !
!
""
#
"
$
#
%
&
"'
&(
#
!)
*
")
+
#
!"! !"# !"$ !"% !"& '"!
!
!""
!
!"
'
'!
'!!
!
!""
!
!"
'
'!
'!!
()*+) ,)+-.-*/*01 +2 30.04 !
!
""
#
"
$
#
%
&
"'
&(
#
!)
*
")
+
#
!"! !"# !"$ !"% !"& '"!
!
!""
!
!"
'
'!
'!!
!
!""
!
!"
'
'!
'!!
()*+) ,)+-.-*/*01 +2 30.04 !
!
""
#
"
$
#
%
&
"'
&(
#
!)
*
")
+
#
Sub-majority
quorum
Super-majority
quorum
A B
C D
Figure 2. Signal detection theory shows when majority-based reasoning is incorrect. Decision scenarios in which
Condorcet will make different kinds of inaccurate predictions about groups of individually-optimal (see Figure 1)
decision-makers (a–c), and in which majority voting is sub-optimal (d); prior probability of state + is on x-axis, ratio
of cost of false positive to cost of false negative is on y-axis, so values larger than one indicate classifying – as + is
relatively worse than classifying + as –, and vice versa. Grey regions show decision scenarios in which Condorcet
leads to at least one predictive error: (a) As group size increases Condorcet incorrectly predicts that majority
group accuracy will asymptotically increase towards 1, whereas it actually does not (Error Ia, main text); (b) As
group size increases Condorcet incorrectly predicts that majority group accuracy will asymptotically increase
towards 1, whereas groups actually make worse decisions than individuals (Error Ib, main text); (c) As group size
increases Condorcet incorrectly predicts that majority group accuracy will decrease towards zero, whereas it
actually converges to a positive level (Error II, main text); (d) Condorcet makes at least one of the errors just
described; this plot also corresponds to decision scenarios in which majority decision-making is suboptimal, and
should be replaced by a sub- (upper-left area) or super- (lower-right area) majority quorum rule as described in
Results. Signal detection analysis for individual decision-makers is described in the Appendix; parameters for the
analysis are   ¼ 0; þ ¼ s ¼ 1; CTP ¼ CTN ¼ 0; CFN ¼ 1; CFP ¼ ratio.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.40368.003
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this curve gives us a unique pair of a+ and a– values dependent on costs and benefits of different
decision outcomes, and the prior probability of the + state, p.
A B
C D
E F
Figure 3. How majority voting can be optimally replaced by quorum decisions. Illustrative failures of simple
majority voting and Condorcet predictions (left column) and their remediation through appropriate use of sub- or
super-majority decision quorums (right column); group size increases on x-axis, while group accuracy increases on
y-axis; red-dashed line indicates individual decision accuracy, black dot-dash line represents prior probability of
state + (panels a and c) or of state – (panel e), solid blue line represents group accuracy. (a) Error Ia: Condorcet
predicts that increasing group size will result in group accuracy converging to 1, but it converges to p which is
above the individual accuracy level. (b) Choosing a super-majority quorum leads group accuracy to converge to 1
with increasing group size. (c) Error Ib: Condorcet predicts that increasing group size will result in group accuracy
converging to 1, but it converges to p which is below the individual accuracy level, hence groups perform worse
than individuals. (d) Choosing a super-majority quorum leads group accuracy to converge to 1 with increasing
group size. (e) Error II: Condorcet predicts that increasing group size will result in group accuracy converging to 0,
but it converges to 1 – p which is below the individual accuracy level. (f) Choosing a sub-majority quorum leads
group accuracy to converge to 1 with increasing group size. Simulations comprise 10,000 replicates with individual
accuracies derived from signal detection analysis with parameters   ¼ 0; þ ¼ s ¼ 1; CTP ¼ CTN ¼ 0; CFN ¼ 1
and: (a) CFP ¼ 4; p ¼ 0:9; q ¼ 0:5, (b) CFP ¼ 4; p ¼ 0:9; q ¼ 0:7, (c) CFP ¼ 1; p ¼ 0:7; q ¼ 0:5,
(d) CFP ¼ 1; p ¼ 0:7; q ¼ 0:75, (e) CFP ¼ 10; p ¼ 0:7; q ¼ 0:5, (f) CFP ¼ 10; p ¼ 0:7; q ¼ 0:035.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.40368.004
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We next make the observation that, to simultaneously improve both true positive and false posi-
tive rates, a group must choose a quorum q that lies between these two values (Wolf et al., 2013);
that is, an optimal group must choose q such that
1  a <q<aþ (2)
The intuition behind this result is that group accuracy will converge on the appropriate accuracy
for the true state of the world, as group size increases; thus, by setting a quorum between these two
accuracies the true state of the world can be determined with high probability for sufficiently large
groups. For further details see (Wolf et al., 2013). Since the simple majority quorum q = 1/2,
assumed by Condorcet, only satisfies this inequality when both aþ>1=2 and a >1=2, when either of
these conditions are violated then both simple majority decisions and Condorcet-based reasoning
will be deficient. Furthermore, we should never see true positive rate (aþ) less than false positive
rate (1  a ) (dark grey region of ROC space in Figure 1), since such a decision-maker could simulta-
neously improve both their true and false positive rates simply by inverting their decisions and mov-
ing above the diagonal. Therefore, the ROC space is divided into two meaningful regions: in the first
aþ>1=2 and a <1=2 (white region in Figure 1), so simple majority voting is asymptotically-optimal
as group size increases, and Condorcet-based predictions are correct. In the second,
aþ<1=2 and a >1=2, or aþ>1=2 and a <1=2; while ensuring aþ>1  a  (light grey regions in Fig-
ure 1); in these regions simple majority decisions will be sub-optimal, and Condorcet-based reason-
ing will be erroneous.
We now describe the systematic errors Condorcet leads to when faced with these decision sce-
narios. These errors can also be described in terms of false positive (frequently referred to as type I)
and false negative (type II) errors, in predicting the performance of the Condorcet majority rule,
hence we label the errors in such terms.
Error Ia: Condorcet predicts group accuracy approaches 1, but majority
groups do not
This error occurs when majority voting is sub-optimal (aþ < 1=2 and a  > 1=2, or aþ > 1=2
and a  < 1=2; light grey regions in Figure 1, as described above), and when expected individual
accuracy a> 1=2, since under this last condition individuals on average make more correct decisions
than incorrect decisions, and Condorcet thus predicts that group accuracy approaches one as group
size increases (King and Cowlishaw, 2007; Boland, 1989). From Equation 1 this requirement is
thus that
p aþ  a ð Þþ a >1=2 (3)
While Condorcet predicts group accuracy (denoted a
 
) approaches 1, that is
n!¥
lima
 
¼ 1 (4)
in fact the majority quorum q = 1/2 is either below 1 – a , or above aþ, contra inequality 2; thus the
group converges to making completely correct choices in one state of the world, and completely
incorrect choices in the other state of the world (Wolf et al., 2013). Hence, group accuracy con-
verges to
n!¥
lima
 
¼
p if aþ>
1
2
and a <
1
2
1  p if aþ<
1
2
and a >
1
2
(
(5)
The wide range of decision scenarios in which Condorcet makes this predictive error are illus-
trated in Figure 2a. An example of this error is presented in Figure 3a; Figure 3b illustrates how
the error can be avoided by choosing an appropriate quorum, in this case a super-majority quorum.
Error Ib: Condorcet predicts group accuracy approaches 1, but majority
groups are worse than individuals
In error Ia, while group accuracy does not converge to one with increasing group size, nothing is
said about whether or not groups are better than individuals. Error Ib refines error Ia, by showing
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that there are cases where Condorcet predicts group accuracy approaching 1, but groups actually
have lower accuracy than individuals. These cases are found by refining the conditions given in error
Ia to include the additional condition that the group accuracy converged to (Equation 5 above) is
less than individual expected accuracy (Equation 1). This gives the conditions
p<
a 
1  aþþ a 
if aþ>
1
2
and a <
1
2
; and (6)
p>
1  a 
1þ aþ  a 
if aþ<
1
2
and a >
1
2
(7)
The wide range of decision scenarios in which Condorcet makes this predictive error are illus-
trated in Figure 2b. An example of this error is presented in Figure 3c; Figure 3d illustrates how
the error can be avoided by choosing an appropriate quorum, in this case a super-majority quorum.
Error II: Condorcet predicts group accuracy approaches 0, but majority
groups do not
In error II individual expected accuracy is below 1/2, thus Condorcet predicts that group accuracy
should converge to 0; while groups using the majority decision rule do decrease in accuracy, they
converge to a non-zero group accuracy given by Equation 5 above. To find cases where this occurs
we simply solve for when individual expected accuracy a < 1/2. From Equation 1 this gives us the
conditions
p<
1=2  a 
aþ  a 
if aþ>
1
2
and a <
1
2
; and (8)
p>
1=2  a 
aþ  a 
if aþ<
1
2
and a >
1
2
(9)
Decision scenarios in which Condorcet makes this predictive error are illustrated in Figure 2c. An
example of this error is presented in Figure 3e; Figure 3f illustrates how the error can be avoided
by choosing an appropriate quorum, in this case a sub-majority quorum.
Note that it is not possible to find an ‘Error IIb’ case that parallels Error Ib; that is if Condorcet
predicts that group accuracy approaches 0, majority groups will always be worse than individuals
and never better, even if their group accuracy remains positive. This is because it is not possible
simultaneously to satisfy the conditions just given (inequalities 8 and 9), and the opposite of the con-
ditions (inequalities 6 and 7) given in Error Ib (i.e. the conditions that group accuracy converged to is
greater than individual expected accuracy), as can be confirmed by algebra.
Majority voting is usually suboptimal
Combining the cases in which Condorcet makes one of the above described predictive errors,
Figure 2d illustrates when Condorcet will make at least one error in predicting the performance of
decision-making groups using majority decision-making. This set also corresponds to the set of deci-
sion scenarios in which majority decision-making is sub-optimal, and is outperformed by an appropri-
ately set sub- or super-majority quorum. Figure 2d shows that Condorcet is optimal in far fewer
decision scenarios than those in which it is outperformed by an appropriate quorum rule. Further-
more, our analysis also relates decision-ecology to the requirement for sub- or super-majority quo-
rums. From inequality (2), sub-majority quorums are required whenever a+ < 1/2, which corresponds
to the upper-left area of Figure 2d; in contrast, super-majority quorums are required whenever 1 –
a+ > 1/2, which corresponds with the lower-right area of Figure 2d (see Supplementary Information).
Thus, whenever the positive state of the world + is rarer, and/or false positives are relatively expen-
sive compared to false negatives, then a sub-majority quorum should typically be employed, while
the converse holds for super-majority quorums.
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Discussion
We have shown that simple majority-based collective decisions are often suboptimal, and that con-
sequently sub- or super-majority quorums should frequently be employed by groups of ‘like-minded’
individuals combining independent decisions. Our results are important for two reasons. First, the
majority-based decision rule, and Condorcet-based reasoning, is widespread in several major
branches of collective decision theory. In the animal behaviour community the Condorcet prescrip-
tion on individual accuracy exceeding ½ has been used to recommend when opinions should be
pooled (King and Cowlishaw, 2007), and when experts should be favoured over group opinions
(Katsikopoulos and King, 2010). Other authors have also invoked Condorcet and majority voting as
the gold-standard for collective decision-making (Hastie and Kameda, 2005; Kao and Couzin,
2014a; Kao et al., 2014b; Miller et al., 2013). These results have been useful in highlighting the
benefits of information pooling in collective decisions, but such studies implicitly neglect the reality
that most decisions have two types of errors. Second, while quorums have been widely studied in
collective decision theory, we here present a comprehensive theory that may help explain their prev-
alence. Sub- and super-majority quorums have been considered theoretically (Sumpter and Pratt,
2009); Sumpter and Pratt implicitly assume only one type of error need be considered, and proceed
from that point with their analysis, referring to quorum functions such as managing speed-accuracy
trade-offs (Marshall et al., 2009). Ward et al. (2008) consider quorum use for facilitating informa-
tion transfer in shoaling fish, yet ignore the possibility of different error types despite their great
asymmetry in the scenario studied, predator detection. Conradt and Roper (2005) in their review
refer to true and false positives, but in explaining quorum usage refer back to earlier analysis as a
mechanism to avoid extreme group decisions where individual fitness interests do not completely
align (Conradt and Roper, 2003). However List (2004) as well as Conradt and List (2009) noted
the effect of cost and prior asymmetry on quorum usage, referring back to earlier political science
results (Ben-Yashar and Nitzan, 1997) discussed below. We also note that convergence on an inter-
mediate group accuracy between 0 and 1 has previously been observed, without consideration of
signal detection theory; the result presented in Figure 1b of Kao and Couzin (2014a) occurs for a
similar reason to our error Ia, in that inappropriate use of a majority decision rule leads increasing
group size to result in group accuracy converging on a parameter of the decision problem, in their
case the reliability of a low correlation cue.
In contrast to these previous analyses here we have shown the fundamental importance of quo-
rums in one of the simplest possible collective behaviour scenarios, single-shot collective decisions in
homogenous groups, where individuals’ interests are aligned, and decision-making abilities do not
differ. Thus, we might expect the use of quorums to be widespread in the natural world, even in the
simplest of decisions. The widespread use of quorum sensing in bacteria provides evidence of this
(Gross, 2017), and may prove a particularly good testbed for our theory given its binary nature and
asymmetric state priors and error costs, although evolutionary conflicts of interests within bacterial
communities may result in confounds. Moreover, as humans have been shown to employ quorum
rules and adaptively adjust the associated quorum thresholds, human decision-making experiments
may also provide a powerful approach to test our predictions (Kurvers et al., 2014; Cle´ment et al.,
2015).
It is surprising that signal detection theory has seen relatively scant application to collective deci-
sion-making. Wolf et al. (2013) noted the potential for different error types in identifying how quo-
rums can improve collective decision accuracy; while motivated by signal detection theory they did
not directly apply it to optimise the individual decision-makers and relate this back to group behav-
iour. Kirstein and von Wangenheim, 2010 also noted the possibility for independent error types,
again with reference to signal detection theory; they noted the potential for Condorcet to make the
same qualitatively incorrect predictions that we note here, however they did not apply the relevant
theory to delineate the situations under which Condorcet reasoning is incorrect, nor did they con-
sider the possibility for quorum-based decision rules to rescue these situations. Sorkin et al. (2001)
applied signal detection theory to Condorcet-like models with varying super-majority quorums, but
did not find the mechanism by which group decisions can be optimised (Wolf et al., 2013).
Laan et al. (2017) noted that Condorcet and majority voting can be suboptimal, and considered
ways in which voting can be improved; while they discussed signal detection theory and voting
mechanisms they neither explicitly considered error types, nor quorum thresholds, focussing mainly
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on correlations between decision-makers and the impact of the cost function used, as well as sug-
gesting a data-driven machine learning approach to improving collective decision-making rules. The
results that most closely anticipate ours are those of Ben-Yashar and Nitzan (1997), who analytically
solved for the general optimal decision rule by recognising both error cost and prior asymmetry, as
well as simultaneously considering the case of variable individual decision-ability (e.g.
Marshall et al., 2017). These results describe the relationship between prior asymmetry and optimal
quorum threshold, and error cost and optimal quorum threshold. However, because they did not
apply signal detection theory to optimise individual agents’ decisions (i.e. they treated true and false
positive rates of individuals as independent from the ecological parameters error cost and prior
asymmetry), they were unable quantitatively to uncover the complex nonlinear relationship between
these three quantities (Figure 2).
In contrast to earlier work, by applying signal detection theory we have simultaneously shown
here both how fragile Condorcet and majority-voting are, and how the use of sub- or super-majority
quorums should relate to decision ecology. Although simple collective behaviour models have been
well studied and highly influential, our results, and others relaxing other assumptions of such models
(Marshall et al., 2017), indicate the subtlety that may be revealed in collective decision-making by a
richer consideration of individual decision theory. Other approaches to such problems should be
pursued in the future. For example, it is possible to optimise individual quorums (Ben-Yashar and
Nitzan, 1997) rather than simply set them within a suitable interval as we do here, thereby giving
greater benefits to smaller groups. Similarly, rather than apply signal detection theory one could
apply Bayesian decision-theory (e.g. Pe´rez-Escudero and de Polavieja, 2011; Arganda et al., 2012;
Pe´rez-Escudero and de Polavieja, 2017), thereby attempting to deal with further complexities such
as non-independence of individual decisions. In many scenarios errors and correct decisions may be
correlated although even when multiple individuals observe the same stimulus their information can
be considered independent due to sensory noise (Marshall et al., 2017). We believe that our simple
approach has, however, the benefit of tractability while still revealing the complexity of collective
decision-making even in the simplified scenario considered.
Our work takes inspiration from political science and decision theory to address questions in
behavioural ecology, but may additionally have the potential to inform work in the design of artificial
decision-making systems, machine learning and robotics. For example, in the field of ensemble
learning, in which predictions from multiple weak classifiers such as neural networks are combined to
improve decision accuracy, variable quorums, referred to as ‘threshold shift’, are used (e.g.
Dmochowski et al., 2010). However majority voting is still among the simplest and most ubiquitous
vote fusion rules discussed (Sagi and Rokach, 2018; Krawczyk et al., 2017). Hence, we suggest
that the simple perspective on how to combine votes presented here may also yield technological
insight.
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Signal detection theory reveals cases where Condorcet
Predictions are incorrect
To determine if a group of optimal decision-makers could exist such that simple application of
Condorcet would lead to erroneous predictions, but a quorum rule would allow optimal
opinion pooling, we consider groups of identically-capable individual decision-makers (as
assumed in Condorcet), modelled as making optimal decisions using signal detection theory in
order to classify continuous signals arising from one of two possible normal signal distributions
of equal variance (Green and Swets, 1966). That is, decision-makers are faced with a signal
s~
N þ;sð Þwithprobabilityp
N  ;sð Þwithprobability1  p

(A.1)
and must choose an optimal signal threshold, x, in order to classify signals as being drawn
from either of the two possible normal distributions. Each distribution has a different mean
(þ versus  ) but the same standard deviation (s). In a natural setting the signal could
represent information as to whether a predator is present or not, for example, with the two
states of the world, predator present versus predator absent, having different distributions for
this signal.
The optimal decision threshold x is chosen to minimise the expected loss for the decision-
maker (or maximise the expected gain). The expected loss from a decision is
E Lossð Þ ¼ p aþCTPþ 1  aþð ÞCFNð Þþ 1  pð Þ a CTN þ 1  a ð ÞCFPð Þ; (A.2)
where CTP, CFN , CTN and CFP are respectively the costs of true positives (correctly classifying
state +), false negatives (incorrectly classifying state –), true negatives (correctly classifying
state –) and false positives (incorrectly classifying state +). Thus, an optimal decision-maker
should minimise (equation A.2) by appropriately choosing the decision threshold x. Since,
given x,
aþ ¼ 1 F þ;s;xð Þ; and (A.3)
a  ¼F  ;s;xð Þ; (A.4)
where F is the cumulative distribution function for the normal distribution, the optimal x can
be found by substituting (equation A.3) and (equation A.4) into (equation A.2),
differentiating the resulting equation and solving for zero (Green and Swets, 1966). Note that
the optimal threshold x, and thus the optimal accuracies under state + and state – of the
world, aþand a  respectively, are affected both by class imbalance (p 6¼ 1=2), and by
asymmetric error costs (CTP   CFN 6¼ CTN   CFP).
Marshall et al. eLife 2019;8:e40368. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7554/eLife.40368 14 of 14
Research Communication Ecology Evolutionary Biology
